The strongest public evidence traces foreign support into Sudan through connected networks of recruiters, contractors, logistics hubs, weapons, drones and money. The most detailed record concerns the Rapid Support Forces (RSF): a 2026 UN fact-finding mission found reasonable grounds to believe that a transnational network linked to people and entities in the United Arab Emirates, Chad, southeastern Libya and Puntland helped move foreign personnel and military supplies into RSF-held areas.
The evidence also shows that the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have used foreign-supplied drones and munitions. But the UN mission says its investigation into external support to the SAF is still at an initial, preliminary stage. The public record is therefore much more developed for the RSF.
That record supports a conclusion that cross-border networks materially sustain RSF operations and that foreign-supplied systems reach both sides. It does not establish a single foreign command center, or prove that a national government directed every company, flight, shipment or contractor. To assess the evidence fairly, separate six links: who made an item, who exported it, who arranged transport, who received it, how it was used, and who authorized or knew about the transaction.
What the evidence can trace
The UN mission’s September 2026 report, Fuelling Sudan’s Conflict, is the most detailed single public account of these connected support networks found in this review. It says it verified information from witnesses with first-hand knowledge, documents, imagery and other sources, and applies a “reasonable grounds to believe” standard. That is a serious investigative finding, not a criminal court verdict.
| Evidence trail | What the public record supports | Where the record stops |
|---|---|---|
| Recruitment and personnel | Colombian contractors were recruited through linked entities, trained, transported through regional hubs and deployed to Sudan. Some worked on drones and other systems. | Contractor estimates are not a verified head count. The UN mission found no Colombian state responsibility. |
| Routes and logistics | The UN mission identified transit hubs in Chad, southeastern Libya and Puntland, linked to people and entities in the UAE. Supplies and personnel moved onward into RSF-controlled territory. | A route through a country does not by itself prove that the country’s government ordered or knowingly enabled it. |
| Weapons and drones | Witness accounts, technical information and authenticated imagery connect foreign-made or foreign-exported systems to battle sites. | Manufacturer, export destination, shipment, end user and state authorization are separate links. A weapon’s origin alone does not reveal who approved its transfer. |
| Money and procurement | U.S. and UK authorities have designated companies and people they say financed, recruited for or procured supplies for the warring parties. | Sanctions are administrative actions, not criminal convictions; public releases do not disclose all underlying evidence. |
The distinction matters because “foreign support” can describe very different conduct: an individual recruiter, a private company, an intermediary moving cargo, a bank account, a military-linked entity, or a government decision. Evidence for one does not automatically prove the next.
The clearest chain: Colombian contractors and the RSF
The most traceable personnel pathway begins with recruitment. The UN mission says it identified entities registered in Colombia and the UAE that worked together to recruit and deploy Colombian former military personnel. It names Col. Álvaro Andrés Quijano Becerra, based in Abu Dhabi, and Claudia Viviana Oliveros Forero, who coordinated recruitment in Colombia. Both were sanctioned by the UN Security Council’s Sudan sanctions committee in April 2026. The mission says it publicly names individuals only when they have already been designated by the relevant committee. In a separate action, U.S. Treasury sanctioned five people and entities it said recruited and deployed former Colombian military personnel for the RSF.
The mission said the recruitment system had operated since at least August 2024. Estimates of the number of Colombian contractors varied widely, from 350 to 2,000; the mission said credible independent information suggested the total might approach 2,000 as recruitment continued. That is an estimate, not a verified head count. The report also records information that some recruits were not told they would be sent to Sudan or were paid less than their contracts specified.
The route evidence is unusually specific. The mission says early groups reportedly traveled through the UAE, Bosaso in Puntland, and Benghazi before crossing southern Libya into Darfur. Later groups reportedly moved through Bosaso or the UAE, then Chad, entering Sudan through Nyala Airport. Witnesses described military-style training at a facility in Ghayathi, in the UAE, and further training in Libya. The mission says contractors operated or maintained surveillance, strike and one-way attack drones, supported artillery and other weapons, and provided technical instruction and intelligence support.
These findings are not based on a single travel account. Human Rights Watch’s 2026 investigation used interviews, company records, social-media material, geolocation, satellite imagery and information from captured Colombians. It also traced recruitment and transit through the UAE, Libya, Bosaso and Chad. Separately, the UN Panel of Experts on Libya reported that Colombian fighters transited Libya to support the RSF, with Kufrah serving as a stopover. These sources provide separate corroboration for parts of the route and recruitment picture.
Together, those sources connect recruitment, training, transit and deployment. The UN mission also places Colombian contractors at operational sites around Nyala and El Fasher, including in drone-related roles. That makes this more than evidence that foreign nationals happened to be in Sudan: it is evidence of a recruitment and support system linked to military operations.
The limits are just as important. The UN mission said it found no information that the Colombian government directed, controlled, supported or endorsed the recruitment and deployment. Colombia acknowledged the involvement of private Colombian entities and individuals. The mission’s report also records that the UAE disputed involvement by entities and individuals under its jurisdiction. These facts support scrutiny of private and corporate networks; they do not establish that either country’s government commanded the operation.
Weapons, aircraft and the changing Am Djarass record
Weapons evidence has to be read as a chain, not a label. A weapon may be made in one country, exported to a second, sold or diverted by an intermediary, moved across a third country, and recovered from a battlefield. Identifying the manufacturer or seeing equipment at a site does not, on its own, identify the official who approved the transfer.
In its 2024 report, the UN Security Council’s Panel of Experts described allegations that cargo aircraft were unloading weapons and ammunition at Am Djarass in Chad as credible, based on sources in Chad and Darfur. The Panel said supplies were then moved by truck toward RSF areas. The UAE said the flights carried humanitarian aid and denied supplying weapons; Chad had not responded to the Panel by the time of that report. The Panel separately found that arms and ammunition had been transferred into Darfur in violation of the arms embargo.
In its 2025 report, the Panel said it was unable to confirm transfers of military materiel from Am Djarass to Darfur at the time it wrote. That qualification deserves to stay in the story. It means the Panel could not verify that particular route to its standard during that reporting period. It does not establish that every flight was humanitarian, or rule out other routes and transactions.
The 2026 fact-finding mission made a broader finding using a wider set of evidence. It said verified information and first-hand witnesses gave it reasonable grounds to believe that a transnational network linked to people and entities in the UAE, Chad, southeastern Libya and Puntland facilitated RSF operations through air, land and maritime routes. It identified Chad, southeastern Libya and Puntland as transit and logistics hubs and described recurring cargo flights from the UAE to Chad, followed by movement of personnel and supplies toward RSF-held areas. These are findings in the 2026 UN report, which also records the UAE’s denial and the mission’s response to it.
The mission also compared reported weapons with authenticated imagery and video. It said some equipment transferred to the RSF from at least April 2025 was consistent with equipment previously exported to the UAE. It verified footage of drone remnants assessed as consistent with CH-95 or FH-95 systems at El Fasher, Nyala and El Obeid. This joins route testimony to physical evidence at operational sites. “Consistent with equipment previously exported to the UAE” is still narrower than proof that the UAE government purchased or dispatched a specific weapon.
The timeline is not a simple reversal: the 2024 Panel called allegations credible; the 2025 Panel could not confirm materiel transfers on one route at the time; and the 2026 mission reported a broader network supported by additional witness, documentary and image evidence. Each conclusion has a different scope. The strongest current public conclusion is that multiple routes and intermediaries helped supply the RSF, while particular flights and government authorization remain questions for further investigation.
Following the money
Financial records and sanctions actions add another kind of trace. In January 2025, the U.S. Treasury designated UAE-based Capital Tap Holding and said it had provided money and weapons to the RSF. Treasury also said a UAE-based gold purchaser bought Sudanese gold, which it presumed was for the RSF’s benefit, and transported it to Dubai. Treasury said the RSF procurement director could access the gold company’s UAE bank account, which held millions of dollars. These are Treasury’s administrative findings, not court judgments.
The Sentry’s 2025 investigation mapped UAE-based companies and gold-trading links associated with the RSF. It also cautioned that Treasury’s public notice did not say whether Capital Tap’s reported support occurred before or after an ownership change in 2024. That timing gap is a useful reminder: identifying a company, a bank account or an owner does not automatically show who controlled a transaction at a particular date. In July 2026, the UK announced its own sanctions on people and firms it said were linked to financing, procurement and trade supporting RSF- or SAF-linked networks, including commercial nodes in Dubai and Hong Kong. Sanctions have identified procurement and finance networks connected to both sides. In January 2025, Treasury said an SAF procurement intermediary coordinated the acquisition of Iranian-made drones from an Azerbaijani defense company for shipment to Sudan.
These actions are useful leads because they identify named entities, transactions and enforcement concerns. But a designation is not a conviction, and a company registered in a country is not automatically an instrument of that country’s government. The underlying records—contracts, payment instructions, beneficial ownership, customs documents and communications—are what can establish the next link.
What is known about foreign support to the SAF?
The evidence is real but less complete. The UN mission’s technical findings in A/HRC/63/23 identify features in SAF-attributed drone footage consistent with Turkish-made Bayraktar Akıncı systems and assess images of munitions as consistent with Yiha III loitering munitions. Because these systems are not made in Sudan, their presence demonstrates foreign-supplied military equipment. The mission says its investigation into the source, scale and use of external support to the SAF is still in its initial phase and that its findings remain preliminary.
Treasury’s January 2025 account adds a procurement link: it said an Azerbaijani defense company supplied Iranian-made UAVs for shipment to Sudan through an SAF procurement network. That identifies a company-to-procurement pathway as described by the U.S. government. It does not show that the Iranian or Azerbaijani government directed the transaction. The UN mission’s foreign-made drone findings also do not independently identify every supplier or route.
The record therefore supports saying that foreign equipment and procurement channels reach both forces. It does not support presenting the public evidence as equally detailed: the 2026 UN report devotes substantially more investigation to RSF networks and explicitly labels its SAF inquiry preliminary.
What the evidence says about governments
The 2026 UN mission found that individuals and entities operating from, registered in or linked to the UAE played a significant role in networks recruiting, financing, transporting and deploying foreign contractors and providing military-related support that benefited the RSF. It urged the UAE to investigate and halt activities conducted from its territory. The UAE denied military, logistical, financial and political support to the RSF and said its regulatory framework could address unlawful conduct. The mission recorded the denial, acknowledged humanitarian assistance from the UAE, and maintained its finding about UAE-linked actors.
That is a consequential finding about networks connected to the UAE. It is not the same as a finding that the UAE’s central government ordered those networks to operate. The public report does not establish a single chain of command running from a government office through each company and shipment to the battlefield. Private actors can use a country’s territory or corporate system without proving state direction; a government’s knowledge, control, authorization or failure to enforce rules requires its own evidence.
The International Court of Justice did not resolve that question in Sudan’s 2025 case against the UAE. The Court declined jurisdiction because of the UAE’s reservation to the Genocide Convention’s jurisdiction clause and removed the case from its list. It expressly did not decide the merits of Sudan’s allegations. The ruling neither proves UAE support nor clears the factual allegations.
The same care applies elsewhere. Chad denied knowing that its territory was being used for arms transfers; the UN mission said private networks used remote areas and acknowledged Chad’s severe security and humanitarian constraints. The mission found no Colombian state responsibility. It received no substantive response from Ethiopia, Libya, South Sudan or Somalia. Non-response is not an admission.
The sherafy.com map of SAF and RSF territorial control answers where the forces hold ground; it cannot identify where their supplies began. And the sherafy.com explainer on the genocide question addresses a separate legal question from this article’s evidence trail.
What evidence would close the remaining gaps?
The strongest missing links are transaction-level records that connect an identified supplier to a shipment and an identified decision-maker. Investigators would need to compare aircraft and vessel manifests with flight tracking, customs records, cargo inspections and overland movement logs; trace money through beneficial ownership and bank instructions; and establish who approved procurement, transport and end use. Messages, contracts, government orders, inspection records and credible testimony could establish knowledge or control where current evidence identifies only a route, company or intermediary.
The public record already traces a substantial support system into the war, especially for the RSF. It links recruiters and contractors to training and transit, logistics hubs to battlefield equipment, and financial entities to procurement. On the SAF side, the evidence establishes foreign-supplied systems and a procurement channel, but the UN inquiry remains preliminary. The clearest answer is therefore strongest on RSF network activity and uneven on state responsibility: external networks are sustaining RSF operations, while the public evidence about SAF support and government roles in particular transfers remains less complete.
Method and currency
This article uses public UN, court, government, human-rights and investigative records available through 23 October 2026. The September 2026 Fact-Finding Mission document available at that cutoff was an advance unedited report. “Reasonable grounds to believe,” “credible allegations,” and sanctions designations are not interchangeable standards. The evidence and official findings may change as investigators obtain records or issue revised reports.
References and Further Reading
UN investigations and official records
- UN Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan, A/HRC/63/23: Fuelling Sudan’s Conflict — The central 2026 report tracing recruitment, equipment, finance, routes and state responses. This is the complete advance unedited copy; the official OHCHR PDF is also available.
- UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, S/2024/65 — The 2024 Panel’s findings on Am Djarass, alleged onward arms transfers and Darfur embargo violations; the complete accessible report copy is also available.
- UN Panel of Experts on Sudan, S/2025/239 — The later report’s qualification that it could not confirm Am Djarass materiel transfers at the time of writing; the complete accessible report copy is also available.
- UN Panel of Experts on Libya, S/2026/224 — Independent UN reporting on Colombian fighters transiting Libya to support the RSF; the official UN record identifies the report and its source.
- International Court of Justice, Sudan v. United Arab Emirates, case 197 — The May 2025 order and case record. The Court dismissed on jurisdictional grounds and did not decide the factual merits.
Sanctions and financial records
- U.S. Treasury, January 2025 RSF and company designations — Treasury’s account of Capital Tap, gold purchases and financial access it said benefited the RSF; administrative findings, not a court judgment.
- U.S. Treasury, January 2025 SAF procurement designations — Treasury’s description of the Azerbaijani-company procurement route for Iranian-made UAVs.
- U.S. Treasury, April 2026 Colombian recruitment-network designations — The U.S. government’s named recruitment-network allegations involving former Colombian military personnel.
- UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, July 2026 Sudan sanctions — UK designations covering alleged finance, procurement and commerce networks linked to both sides.
Independent investigations and cross-checks
- Human Rights Watch, From Bogotá to El Fasher — Original investigation using interviews, documents, satellite imagery and geolocated material to trace Colombian contractors and their routes; includes the UAE’s denial.
- The Sentry, Sudan’s RSF: A Corporate and Financial Network — Investigative analysis of RSF-linked companies and gold flows, with a useful caveat on the timing of Capital Tap’s reported activity.
- Associated Press, 3 September 2026 report on the UN findings — A concise contemporaneous account of the report’s release and government responses; its central evidence derives from the UN report above.
