Update — November 14, 2026: The FAA lifted the nationwide departure restriction at about 8:15 p.m. Eastern on Friday, but airline recovery continued Saturday and was expected to take through Sunday. Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said a contractor's work replacing part of an old copper communications line with fiber somehow caused an overload; officials were still investigating whether contractor error or a faulty router triggered it. The severed fiber line reported in September was part of a separate Philadelphia-area outage. No final public report has established the November failure sequence or assigned responsibility. AP's Saturday report covers the developing explanation and recovery forecast; its September report documents the distinct regional fiber-cut incident.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) stopped most departures from U.S. airports on Friday, November 13, 2026, after communications problems disrupted air traffic control operations at multiple centers. The nationwide ground stop lasted about four hours and 21 minutes, from its formal effective start at 3:54 p.m. Eastern until departures resumed at approximately 8:15 p.m. The FAA Command Center’s original Advisory 111 lists the event window beginning at 3:53 p.m. Eastern and an effective start at 3:54 p.m. Planes already in the air were managed separately; the order did not mean every aircraft had to land immediately or that every control tower had failed. The FAA's initial public statement said the information was preliminary and confirmed communications issues at multiple Air Route Traffic Control Centers.
Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy initially described aging routers and switches becoming overloaded and producing inconsistent data used by air traffic control facilities. On Saturday, he said a contractor had been replacing part of an old copper telecommunications line with fiber and installing a new router, and that the work somehow caused the overload. The Associated Press reported that officials were investigating whether contractor error or a faulty router was responsible. The Saturday account referred to “a contractor” without naming the company that performed this specific work. Separate reporting connected the affected legacy network to L3Harris Technologies, which operates the FAA's longstanding Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI); that role does not establish who performed the line work or who was at fault. Earlier CBS reporting, summarized by The Verge, attributed the outage to a network update and reboot, but no final public technical report has established that sequence. The Verge's account should be read as attributed preliminary reporting, not a final finding.
Then came the money question. Duffy said the federal government needed $50 billion to replace outdated air traffic control technology. But Congress had already appropriated $12.5 billion for a modernization initiative, and a separate $30.1 billion Senate proposal contained billions not earmarked for replacing the communications network. Federal auditors had also warned in September that the modernization program lacked a reliable comprehensive cost estimate and an integrated project schedule. Those are documented facts, not proof of fraud. They make it essential to separate the genuine need for resilient infrastructure from the question of how much money is needed, what it would buy and who would receive it. Duffy's $50 billion remarks were reported by Business Insider; the bill's text and GAO's September 2026 audit allow those claims to be checked.
This investigation distinguishes what is confirmed, what contractors and officials say, what reporters have learned from unnamed sources, and what remains unknown. The central issue is not simply why flights stopped. It is how a national safety-critical network became unreliable, whether its safeguards worked, and how the public can judge the enormous spending proposed to prevent a repeat.
At a glance: November 14, 2026
| Question | Best-supported answer as of Saturday, November 14 |
|---|---|
| Is the ground stop still active? | No. The FAA lifted it at approximately 8:15 p.m. Eastern Friday. Airline disruption continued Saturday; FAA officials expected schedules to recover by Sunday. |
| Why did the FAA stop departures? | Communications and data problems affected multiple air traffic control centers; the FAA imposed a precautionary nationwide departure restriction. |
| What equipment and work were implicated? | Duffy said a contractor's copper-to-fiber line replacement and new-router work somehow caused older equipment to overload. Officials were still examining contractor error versus a faulty router; the complete failure chain was unresolved. |
| Did the severed fiber line cause the November stop? | No evidence reviewed identifies a severed line as the November cause. The reported fiber cut occurred in a separate Philadelphia-area outage in September. |
| Which company operates the legacy telecommunications network? | L3Harris operates the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI), and reporting linked the affected legacy network to it. That does not establish that L3Harris performed the November line work or caused the incident. |
| Was there a software update? | CBS reporting, as relayed by The Verge, attributed the outage to a network update and reboot. This remains an attributed preliminary account, not an official final root-cause finding. |
| Was it an AI failure or cyberattack? | Officials said they had found no evidence of a cyberattack or a SMART connection in their public statements; no final technical report had established the full cause. |
| Did one company receive $50 billion? | No. The $50 billion was a stated funding need, not an identified contract, payment or enacted appropriation. |
| Can affected passengers get refunds? | Generally yes for an airline-canceled flight, or a significant qualifying change, if the passenger declines the offered travel alternatives. |
Currency note: This is a time-sensitive incident. The latest operational and technical account summarized here is from November 14, 2026; flight counts, airline waivers and subsequent technical findings may change. Dates and monetary categories below are identified to prevent a proposal, contract ceiling, obligation or expenditure from being mistaken for another.
Is the FAA Nationwide Ground Stop Over, and How Many Flights Were Affected?
Yes. Departures resumed at approximately 8:15 p.m. Eastern on November 13. FAA Command Center Advisory 111 records the event window from 3:53 p.m. Eastern and its effective start at 3:54 p.m. The stop therefore lasted about four hours and 21 minutes by the formal effective time. The Department of Transportation's announcement recorded the reopening around 8:15 p.m. Some contemporaneous coverage cited an earlier 3:44 p.m. time; without a complete public event log, that should not replace the advisory's formal effective time.
At 8:39 p.m. Eastern, FlightAware figures cited by The Verge showed 5,901 flight cancellations and 9,124 delays involving the United States. These are a snapshot, not final totals or a count of passengers. Different news organizations published different numbers because their snapshots and definitions differed. Associated Press reporting also described hundreds of diversions and disruptions to passenger, sports and cargo travel.
The end of a ground stop does not restore a schedule instantly. Aircraft are in the wrong places, flight crews can exceed permitted duty time, aircraft need maintenance and turnaround, airport gates are occupied, and passengers have missed connections. On Saturday, FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford said airlines expected schedules to return to normal by the end of Sunday; officials warned that thousands of cancellations and delays could continue during recovery. This was a forecast, not a final count. AP's November 14 report describes the continuing disruption.
For a particular booking, check the operating airline's flight status and travel waiver, not just the nationwide FAA status. A lifted FAA restriction gives an airline permission to depart; it does not guarantee that its airplane and crew are available.
What Actually Caused the November 13 FAA Communications Outage?
The best-supported public explanation as of Saturday, November 14, has four levels.
- Confirmed operational event: The FAA said a communications issue affected multiple Air Route Traffic Control Centers, and it imposed a nationwide ground stop for safety. FAA statement, November 13.
- Preliminary government explanation: Duffy described older routers and switches overloaded with data, producing inconsistent information affecting radar and communications at air traffic facilities. Contemporaneous account of the briefing.
- Saturday's preliminary government account: Duffy said a contractor was replacing part of an old copper communications line with fiber and installing a new router, and that the work somehow caused the overload. AP reported that officials were investigating whether contractor error or a faulty router was responsible. The public account did not identify the contractor performing this particular work or establish the complete failure sequence. AP's November 14 report.
- Earlier, more specific but unconfirmed reporting: CBS News, citing sources, reported that an update to the private communications network managed by L3Harris caused a reboot and outage. The nature of the update, which device changed first, and the precise fault sequence were not established in a public final incident report. The Verge's attribution to CBS.
Those statements are compatible, but they are not interchangeable. Overloaded legacy switches and routers are the preliminary failure mechanism described by officials. The copper-to-fiber work and router installation are a reported activity associated with the failure, but the exact trigger remains undetermined. Earlier reporting described a network update and reboot. Contractor responsibility would require evidence about which company authorized, implemented, tested and monitored each change, as well as the agreed responsibilities for redundancy and incident response.
Did a severed fiber line cause the November 13 outage?
The reported severed cable was part of a separate September 21, 2026 regional outage, not the November 13 nationwide ground stop. On September 21, the primary communications circuit at the Philadelphia TRACON failed; when the system tried to use its backup, officials found that a fiber-optic cable in New Jersey had been severed by construction workers. That incident disrupted Northeast airports. AP's contemporaneous report describes the primary-line failure and cut backup fiber. For November 13, Duffy instead described contractor work replacing copper with fiber and installing a router. The public evidence reviewed does not say that the November fiber was cut or severed.
Did one router shut down the entire country?
That has not been shown. A router or switch can be part of a shared network dependency, so faults can propagate beyond the device itself. But a nationwide operational response does not prove a single national router failed, or that every regional facility went offline. It can also reflect the FAA's inability to maintain confidence in the integrity of data across multiple facilities.
A credible investigation must identify the first affected site and equipment, the traffic or configuration event, the affected routes and circuits, what backup services did, and the recovery step that restored trustworthy information.
Did the outage begin in Chicago?
Early reports pointed to disruption in the Chicago area and suggested other centers were affected afterward. Those reports may be useful leads, but they do not establish that Chicago contained the original fault or explain how the disruption spread. The initiating location should be treated as not yet confirmed until the FAA publishes an incident chronology.
Was it radar, radio or a computer network?
Those are different parts of the system. Radar and other surveillance equipment detect or receive aircraft position information. Communications infrastructure moves voice and data between facilities. Computers display, correlate and distribute the information controllers rely on. A network problem can make valid source information unavailable or inconsistent without every physical radar transmitter failing. Likewise, a disruption in the distribution of radio or coordination services is different from every aircraft losing radio contact.
The precise affected components are a central missing fact, not a technicality.
Which Company Runs the FAA Telecommunications Network? L3Harris and FTI Explained
L3Harris Technologies operates and modernizes the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure, commonly called FTI. The company describes it as the communications backbone serving air traffic facilities, radar sites, weather installations and remote connections. Its own FTI program description says it uses multiple local telecommunications carriers and redundant paths.
L3Harris is an American defense and aerospace technology company with its corporate headquarters at 1025 W. NASA Boulevard, Melbourne, Florida. Its geographic location is distinct from the locations of individual FAA network components. The relevant issue is its documented role and contractual responsibility.
The Wall Street Journal reported, citing people briefed on the matter, that the affected telecommunications network was overseen by L3Harris. CBS sources reportedly linked a network update and reboot to the outage. Those reports make L3Harris's role newsworthy, but they do not establish that the company negligently caused the November 13 shutdown. See the contemporary report summarizing the CBS account and L3Harris's own description of its FTI responsibilities.
Who is responsible: the FAA, L3Harris or a local carrier?
These are different layers of responsibility:
- FAA: The federal operator and regulator of the national air traffic system, responsible for procurement, safety decisions, contractor oversight and public accountability.
- L3Harris: The FTI program contractor, providing network management and modernization services under federal arrangements. Its precise fault or contractual responsibility in this outage has not been publicly established.
- Local telecommunications carriers: Companies supplying individual physical circuits and services under the network architecture. Their involvement must be established for each affected service; a failure in one provider is not automatically a failure by L3Harris.
- FAA facilities and other technology vendors: Operators and suppliers of connected voice, surveillance, data and traffic-management systems, whose interfaces may matter to the final analysis.
This distinction prevents two opposite mistakes: blaming a contractor simply because it operates an affected network, or assuming that operating a government network removes a contractor from scrutiny whenever something goes wrong.
The FAA had already blamed L3Harris for a different backup-system failure
A prior incident makes the oversight question concrete. Following a September 19, 2025 outage affecting Dallas-Fort Worth and Dallas Love Field, the FAA stated on September 20 that multiple failures of TDM telecommunications service supplied by a local carrier named Frontier affected Dallas TRACON. The FAA then expressly said that L3Harris's oversight had failed to ensure the redundancies worked properly. This was an official finding about the 2025 Dallas incident, not a finding about November 2026. Read the FAA's dated Dallas statement.
In June 2025, a telecommunications disruption at the Jacksonville regional center produced losses of some radar, frequencies and automation equipment, yet the FAA said critical air traffic services continued because of equipment and telecommunications redundancies. The two incidents reveal what a useful investigation should test: which backups were supposed to operate, whether they were independent, and whether their performance was verified. FAA Jacksonville and Dallas statements.
One clarification matters: Frontier, the provider named in the Dallas incident, was a telecommunications company, not Frontier Airlines.
L3Harris advertises extraordinarily high network reliability. What does that measure?
L3Harris's FTI marketing materials claim 99.99971% network reliability and describe built-in redundancy. That is a vendor-reported performance figure, not an independently audited guarantee that every service works at every moment or that a national ground stop is impossible. Network-level uptime can use a different denominator from the availability of an individual safety-critical service at a particular location.
The relevant questions are whether the metric includes degraded but technically operating circuits, how it treats planned maintenance, whether interconnected failures are counted, and what service-level agreements apply to safety-critical facilities. A public performance claim is useful only when its measurement rules are visible.
L3Harris also reported in May 2026 that more than half of its FAA telecommunications modernization work had been completed. That is a company progress claim. It should not be equated automatically with every FAA or GAO modernization percentage, which may cover different equipment and dates.
L3Harris, AT&T, Peraton and Air Space Intelligence: Who Does What?
A major source of confusion is the assumption that one company runs, owns and is rebuilding the entire American air traffic system. The FAA has multiple overlapping programs, legacy contracts and modernization vendors. Being awarded a modernization contract does not mean a company operated the service that failed on November 13.
| Organization | Headquarters | Documented FAA role | What the contract does not establish |
|---|---|---|---|
| L3Harris Technologies | Melbourne, Florida | Operates and modernizes the legacy FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI); reporting connected the affected network to FTI. | It is not yet proven that L3Harris caused the November 13 failure or breached its contract in this incident. |
| AT&T | Dallas, Texas | Selected in August 2026 to lead the next-generation FAA Enterprise Network Services (FENS) telecommunications backbone, replacing Verizon as prime contractor on that new program. | A new FENS award does not mean the replacement network had taken over or was responsible for the failing legacy service on Friday. |
| Peraton | Reston, Virginia | Prime systems integrator coordinating multiple programs within the broader Brand New Air Traffic Control System (BNATCS) modernization. | A coordination role does not make Peraton the operator of every FAA circuit or establish its involvement in the outage. |
| Air Space Intelligence (ASI) | Boston, Massachusetts | Supplier of FAA SMART and Flow Management Data & Services (FMDS) traffic-management software. | Its planning software is not the same thing as the underlying voice/radar communications network, and no causal link to the outage had been substantiated. |
| Verizon | New York, New York | Previously selected for FENS before the FAA chose AT&T as the new prime in August 2026. | Its earlier FENS role does not identify it as the operator or cause of the November 13 legacy-network outage. |
Ownership note: Peraton is a portfolio company of Veritas Capital, a private-equity investment firm specializing in government-related technology businesses. Veritas confirmed the relationship when the FAA selected Peraton. This identifies an investor with an economic interest in a federal contractor; it does not establish favoritism, improper influence or fault for the outage.
Company locations are drawn from L3Harris's headquarters listing, Peraton's locations page, and Aviation Week's account of AT&T's FENS award. The FAA announced Peraton's integrator role; ASI identifies its own $875 million software award. The location of a contractor's headquarters is not evidence that equipment physically located there caused an outage.
FTI versus FENS: What is actually being replaced?
FTI is the FAA's existing telecommunications infrastructure. It uses an extensive mix of carrier services and legacy equipment to link hundreds of aviation facilities, including control centers, radar sites, voice systems and weather installations. L3Harris is the established network contractor.
FENS, or FAA Enterprise Network Services, is the planned successor: a more modern, IP-based, high-availability backbone intended to replace the legacy FTI environment. GAO describes FENS's purpose in its September audit. Aviation Week reported that AT&T replaced Verizon as the prime contractor for the new FENS program in August 2026.
This is a transition between systems, not a magic switch that changes the whole network overnight. The legacy environment can remain essential while replacements are planned, constructed, tested and placed into operational service. Questions about how old and new systems coexist are highly relevant, but no evidence reviewed here establishes that a FENS cutover specifically caused the November 13 incident.
How large are the named companies' FAA modernization contracts?
Different reported figures have different meanings:
- Peraton: GAO reported a $1.5 billion contract ceiling for the systems integrator and an approximately $876 million final negotiated price after scope adjustments. The ceiling is a contractual maximum, not evidence that $1.5 billion has been spent or paid. GAO audit, contract discussion and footnote 36.
- Air Space Intelligence: ASI announced a 12-year, $875 million award covering SMART and FMDS software. That headline contract value should not be treated as cash already delivered to the company. It is a separate award from Peraton's similarly sized negotiated price.
- AT&T: The FAA selected it for the future FENS network in August 2026. A publicly identifiable early-start task order exists in USAspending's federal award records; individual task orders or obligations must not be confused with the full cost of a completed national network.
- L3Harris: Its FTI responsibilities, replacement work and separate aviation surveillance awards are public, but an up-to-date reconciled amount paid specifically for the November 13 services is not established by the evidence presented here. Its July 2026 surveillance modernization award is a different program and should not be mischaracterized as payment for the Friday failure.
The distinction matters because a contract ceiling, negotiated price, award, appropriation, obligation and actual federal expenditure are not synonyms. Combining them indiscriminately produces impressive but misleading totals.
Did the FAA Really Need $50 Billion, and Where Would That Money Go?
The $50 billion figure was a demand expressed by Transportation Secretary Duffy after the ground stop, not an announced $50 billion contract to L3Harris or any other vendor. Duffy said decades-old equipment could not handle current data loads and called for a comprehensive replacement program. The public records and reporting reviewed through Saturday, November 14, still did not include an independently validated lifecycle-cost estimate reconciling that request with existing appropriations, proposed legislation and the full modernization program. Business Insider's account of the Friday briefing.
To understand the money, there are three different financial categories to keep separate.
| Amount | What it represents | Status and important limitation |
|---|---|---|
| $12.5 billion | Federal funds enacted in July 2025 for FAA air traffic control modernization, including $9 billion for systems and $3.5 billion for facilities. | Already appropriated. The $9 billion systems portion includes $4.75 billion explicitly for telecommunications infrastructure modernization; that $4.75 billion is not extra money on top of $12.5 billion. |
| $30.1 billion | Funding specified in the Modern Skies Act, S. 5572, introduced September 28, 2026. | Proposed, not enacted in the reviewed legislative record. Only some provisions directly address the telecommunications backbone. |
| $50 billion | Duffy's publicly stated amount needed to replace outdated hardware and software. | Political/agency funding request, not a single contractor payment. No publicly substantiated reconciliation was provided showing how it relates to the existing appropriation, pending bill, and full project lifecycle costs. |
The enacted funding is documented in Public Law 119-21, Section 40003, the 2026 GAO audit, and the Congressional Research Service's modernization discussion. The proposed $30.1 billion is detailed in the introduced bill, S. 5572.
You cannot responsibly add every number in that table and claim the FAA has already received the total. You also cannot assume that Duffy's $50 billion would all flow through S. 5572. Officials would need to publish a component-by-component plan that reconciles the overlapping requests.
We read the $30.1 billion bill. Here is the actual breakdown.
The Modern Skies Act is regularly described in broad terms as a $30 billion proposal to modernize American aviation. But the introduced statutory text assigns the money to distinct purposes:
| Proposed allocation | Amount | What the bill actually funds |
|---|---|---|
| A new transitional-hub airport terminal pilot program | $10.0 billion | Rehabilitation or reconstruction of terminals and related infrastructure at no more than three qualifying airports. |
| Consolidation of terminal air traffic control facilities | $0.3 billion | Consolidating selected terminal ATC facilities. |
| Common automation platform and controller workstation | $7.2 billion | Controller technology and system automation. |
| Cloud computing and related telecommunications infrastructure | $2.0 billion | Cloud and telecommunications support for the national airspace system. |
| Strategic air traffic flow-management technologies | $0.6 billion | Traffic-flow management tools. |
| Terminal ATC facilities, including digital towers | $2.0 billion | Physical air traffic control facilities. |
| Discretionary airport project grants | $3.0 billion | Eligible airport infrastructure grants. |
| Airport terminal development grants | $5.0 billion | Development projects at eligible airports. |
| Total | $30.1 billion | Proposed funding across several different aviation purposes. |
The $2 billion line explicitly identifying cloud computing and telecommunications represents about 6.6% of the bill's $30.1 billion total. That calculation does not mean only 6.6% could improve air traffic control or that other automation spending is unnecessary. It means the headline bill is much broader than repairing routers and telecommunications circuits.
The $10 billion pilot for no more than three airports is particularly worth understanding. Section 3 limits eligibility to medium-hub airports with a principal passenger terminal constructed before 1990, no comprehensive terminal redevelopment since then, and a project that has completed environmental review and entered final design. The federal share may cover up to 90% of the selected project's costs. The money could support terminal reconstruction, baggage systems, passenger circulation, cargo facilities and other eligible works. No particular three airports are named as awardees in the bill. Modern Skies Act, Section 3.
One airport has already been publicly promoted as a potential beneficiary: St. Louis Lambert International Airport in Missouri. Senator Eric Schmitt, the Missouri senator who introduced the bill, said he could not think of a more deserving airport, while Duffy appeared in St. Louis to promote the proposal. The senator emphasized that other airports could also qualify, and officials described any eventual selection as competitive. That does not mean Lambert has received a grant or that favoritism has been established. It does make selection criteria, applicant eligibility and potential local beneficiaries a concrete question rather than a hypothetical one. Missouri public-radio reporting on the senator's remarks and Duffy's visit.
Those projects may have real economic and operational value. They are not the same intervention as replacing an overloaded router, improving a voice circuit's backup path or isolating a common communications failure. If the November 13 outage is used to justify the entire bill, the public is entitled to know which sections would address the failure, which solve other aviation problems, and why each allocation is proportionate.
A further provision would let the FAA transfer funds among categories within parts of the modernization program, subject to reporting requirements. Flexibility can accelerate construction, but it also makes public tracking of the originally advertised purposes important. Modern Skies Act, Sections 4–6.
Does the $30 billion plan contradict the $50 billion demand?
Not necessarily. One is the size of a particular bill; the other is a broader stated need. They may cover different time frames and projects. But that distinction cannot replace the missing calculation.
A serious funding case should show the full set of projects, which are already financed, which require new appropriations, operating and maintenance expenses, annual spending, procurement milestones, expected safety improvements and scenarios in which costs change. Without that record, a round-number total is not a cost model.
Is the $50 billion request a money grab?
There is evidence of substantial financial interests and weaknesses in federal cost oversight. There is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the requested funding is fraudulent or that the outage was engineered to obtain it.
Contractors, airport sponsors and suppliers would naturally have economic interests in a major modernization program. The Department of Transportation also identified a broad aviation-industry coalition supporting the Modern Skies Act. DOT's September 28 announcement openly describes these supporters and the broad purposes of the bill. Neither commercial benefit nor lobbying in support of infrastructure spending is, by itself, evidence of bribery or corruption.
But a legitimate need for safer, more reliable technology does not establish that any proposed dollar amount is justified. Asking for tens of billions in the immediate aftermath of a disruption while the exact failure remains under investigation makes the underlying cost analysis, bidding, contract incentives and independent oversight especially important.
The most defensible conclusion is that the infrastructure problem is real, the spending proposal is broad, and the public record has not yet justified treating the $50 billion figure as a verified cost to prevent another November 13 outage.
What Had Federal Auditors Warned About Before the Ground Stop?
On September 14, 2026, two months before the shutdown, the Government Accountability Office published a detailed audit of the FAA's accelerated modernization program. It identified problems that are specific, measurable and independently documented.
105 of 138 systems were considered unsustainable or potentially unsustainable
GAO summarized a prior sustainability assessment in which 51 of 138 FAA air traffic control systems were rated unsustainable and 54 potentially unsustainable. Together, 105 systems, approximately 76% of those assessed, received one of those two ratings. The assessment considered factors such as obsolete components, maintenance risks and parts availability. It does not mean 76% of air traffic systems stopped working, and it does not identify which systems caused the November 13 outage. GAO's 2024 findings and September 2026 follow-up.
GAO also reported that some legacy information displays still depended on obsolete technologies such as floppy disks and that much of the telecommunications infrastructure used copper dating back to the 1960s. The age of equipment matters because it affects replacement parts, carrier support, reliability and the cost of recovery after faults.
Modernization is happening, but progress figures need real denominators
As of May 2026, GAO said the FAA had replaced 2,560 of 5,170 targeted legacy copper connections, roughly 49.5%. Other government or company statements described later progress with somewhat different percentages. Those measures should not be plotted as one continuous series without verifying that they cover the same equipment, time period and definition of completion. GAO's published progress figure.
The audit reported an accelerated first-phase completion target of December 2028. The important questions are not simply whether a percentage is high, but whether the most critical weak points were prioritized, whether the new equipment passed resilience testing and how much of the old network remained in live service.
GAO found 11,389 schedules without an integrated master schedule
GAO reported 11,389 separate project schedules that had not been integrated into a single master schedule for the modernization effort. The agency warned this could lead to repeated work at the same facilities, poorly coordinated installations and operational disruption. The FAA had plans to address the problem but had not given auditors a completion date at the time of the report. GAO, September 14, 2026.
That finding is significant because technicians cannot simply shut down an air traffic control center to replace all its equipment. Live-system changes must coordinate with other contractors, adjacent control centers, controllers and operational contingency plans. Poor scheduling is not proven to have caused this incident, but it is a recognized risk in a system being modernized while it remains operational.
The most serious financial finding: no reliable full lifecycle cost estimate
GAO said the FAA's modernization effort did not have a comprehensive, well-documented lifecycle cost estimate. High-level numbers provided to auditors omitted government-related costs, most ongoing operations and maintenance costs, and phase-two costs. Officials could not readily produce the underlying analysis supporting some figures. That makes it difficult to test whether the amount requested will actually buy a complete, maintainable system. Full GAO findings and the Transportation Department's response.
GAO noted that the program's $10.6 billion estimate for phase-one systems modernization understated the full costs because of those omissions. The FAA had separately identified about $10.2 billion for a later automation phase, not including related facilities. These program estimates should not be casually added to, or treated as replacements for, the wider $30.1 billion legislative package without reconciling scope and dates.
The FAA waived many of its normal acquisition requirements
A less-discussed point in the GAO report deserves close attention: in August 2025, the FAA administrator applied a blanket waiver exempting the new air traffic modernization programs from nearly all requirements of the FAA's Acquisition Management System. The stated rationale was to accelerate replacement of equipment that had become increasingly unreliable. Among the requirements waived was the normal lifecycle cost-estimation process.
GAO acknowledged that modernization needed to move faster. But it warned that bypassing critical cost and planning disciplines increased the danger of cost overruns, missed targets and poor accountability. The Transportation Department disputed parts of GAO's assessment, and GAO explained why it maintained its findings. Read the waiver discussion and agency comments in the GAO report.
This is a concrete oversight problem, not a theory about hidden motives. The government is seeking enormous additional funding for a program whose independent auditor says the total cost has not been reliably established. That deserves a transparent, auditable response before new appropriations are treated as a guaranteed solution.
How Can One Communications Outage Ground Flights Nationwide?
The U.S. air traffic control system is not a set of independent airport towers. Aircraft move through a chain of facilities. A simplified domestic flight can pass from a departure tower to a Terminal Radar Approach Control facility (TRACON), then one or more Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCCs), then an arrival TRACON and destination tower. Controllers rely on dependable voice links, surveillance data, flight plans and coordination between facilities. GAO provides an overview of the national air traffic system and its communications backbone.
The FAA has 22 en route control centers, but their operations are interconnected. Shared services help distribute information and coordinate handoffs. A problem that makes those services unreliable can lower the amount of air traffic the system can handle safely, even when many individual controllers, radars and radio facilities are still functioning.
Consider the difference between four types of failure:
| System | What it does | What a disruption could mean |
|---|---|---|
| Air-to-ground voice | Carries controllers' and pilots' clearances and communications. | Some frequencies or remote radio connections become unavailable or harder to use. |
| Ground-to-ground telecommunications | Connects air traffic facilities and transfers information between them. | Controllers face unreliable handoffs or coordination between facilities. |
| Surveillance data | Brings aircraft position, altitude and identity information into ATC systems. | Data may arrive late, be inconsistent or become unavailable to a display. |
| Flight-plan and traffic-flow data | Supports routing, sequencing and the management of national capacity. | Facilities lose information needed to safely and efficiently accept more aircraft. |
The system might experience one of these problems without all four failing. Duffy's reference to radar and communications data suggests why investigators must specify exactly what was lost or degraded, rather than using the vague phrase the computers went down.
A ground stop is a safety measure that prevents the system from taking on more traffic than it can reliably manage. The restriction is not itself proof that airborne aircraft lost navigation or that controllers were unable to speak to any pilot.
Why didn't the FAA use a regional ground stop?
Ordinary ground stops are often imposed at a single airport or region because of weather, runway closures, staffing and equipment problems. A nationwide order is exceptional. The FAA's national ground-stop procedures call for evaluating less restrictive measures first and coordinating the decision through the Command Center.
That means the public should be able to receive an explanation of which facilities were affected, why normal restrictions were insufficient, how exceptions were determined and what objective restoration tests justified lifting the nationwide order. The FAA Command Center's advisories and logs are essential primary records for that analysis.
Why didn't backup circuits just take over?
A backup is only useful if it survives the original problem. Two cables routed through the same trench can fail together. Two ostensibly independent services can depend on the same carrier facility, power supply, router configuration or network-management process. Redundant hardware may also require the same data source or software controls to operate.
These are examples of possible common-mode failures, not findings about November 13. Investigators need to establish whether each critical service had physically and logically independent backups, whether those backups activated, and whether the FAA tested them under realistic peak demand.
L3Harris's multi-carrier design claims, the FAA's 2025 Dallas findings and the contrasting Jacksonville incident make that question measurable rather than theoretical.
Is old TDM infrastructure actually analog?
The FAA is replacing legacy Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) services with newer Internet Protocol (IP) systems. TDM allocates communications capacity in scheduled time slots and is itself a digital technology, even though many connected older voice switches and interfaces may be analog. Describing every TDM component as analog is technically inaccurate.
The real modernization challenge is reliability and maintainability: scarce replacement parts, declining carrier support, aging interfaces, the difficulty of running old and new systems together, and the need to preserve independent paths during transitions. The GAO audit's telecommunications section identifies outdated copper, voice switches and communications equipment as material weaknesses.
A modern IP network can support flexible routing and monitoring, but it can also introduce shared software and configuration dependencies if poorly designed. Modern does not automatically mean resilient. Independence, tested failover and fault isolation matter more than the technology label alone.
Did the New FAA SMART AI System Cause the November 13 Outage?
There is no verified causal connection between SMART and Friday's ground stop in the reviewed evidence. The timing is notable, and the rollout raises legitimate oversight questions, but a rollout occurring before an outage is not proof that it caused the outage.
On November 10, three days before the incident, the FAA announced that SMART, its Strategic Management of Airspace, Routes and Trajectories system, was expanding to the airspace of all 22 en route centers. The FAA says SMART draws on approximately 200 data streams, including flight paths, weather, demand and staffing, and provides planning recommendations that agency specialists review before sending them through the Command Center. FAA SMART expansion statement.
The company behind the tool, Air Space Intelligence (ASI), publicly denied that SMART or any ASI integration caused the ground stop. ABC News reported the company's statement. As a vendor statement, that denial is evidence of the company's position, not a substitute for an independent incident report. Officials also said they had found no evidence linking the incident to AI at the time.
SMART's documented role as an advisory airspace-planning system is different from the legacy telecommunications network used to move voice and surveillance data. The distinction is important because software can be part of a large technical environment without being the source of every failure within it.
Congress had already raised questions about SMART's testing
An October 9, 2026 letter led by lawmakers including Sen. Chris Van Hollen and Rep. April McClain Delaney asked the FAA for information about safety testing, frontline training, the initial 90-day evaluation period, and the conditions required before national expansion. The initial rollout began September 21, and the FAA announced expansion November 10, roughly 50 days later. Read the letter's questions and accompanying statement.
The discrepancy deserves an answer: Was the planned evaluation changed, completed early, conducted under a different schedule, or considered sufficient for staged deployment? That is a separate question about deployment governance. It cannot be used as proof that SMART malfunctioned on November 13.
Peraton's use of AI-assisted modernization scheduling, discussed in the GAO audit, is also distinct from ASI's SMART traffic-management software. Conflating the two creates a misleading impression that every FAA reference to AI describes a single product.
Was the FAA Hacked, or Was the Outage Connected to Microsoft?
Authorities said they had found no indication of a cyberattack or malicious act as of Friday evening. That is not the same as a completed forensic determination that could never change. A failure caused by network configuration, device overload or software maintenance would be technically plausible without an attacker, but the precise initiating event remained unresolved. AP's November 13 reporting and Duffy's Friday briefing coverage.
A major Microsoft 365 disruption occurred shortly before the FAA incident, making a connection an understandable question. But the similar timing and the fact that both involved digital infrastructure do not establish a shared cause. Microsoft said there was no indication its service disruption was connected to the FAA event, according to contemporaneous reporting on the nationwide ground stop. The two incidents should be investigated on their own evidence. A separate Sherafy investigation of the November 12–13 Microsoft outage reviews its service-health notices and evolving network-capacity explanation; it provides context on that incident, not evidence of a connection to the FAA failure.
Likewise, there is no verified basis to describe the outage as sabotage, a deliberate attempt to win modernization funding or an action by a foreign government. If later technical records reveal such evidence, the conclusion should change. Until then, a strong investigation does not manufacture a motive to fill an evidentiary gap.
FAA Ground Stops: The Timeline That Puts November 2026 in Context
The nationwide interruption was unusual, but communications and information-system failures have occurred before. Their mechanisms and outcomes provide useful comparisons.
| Date | Event or documented finding | What it establishes |
|---|---|---|
| January 11, 2023 | An outage in the FAA's Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) system led to a national departure pause. | A nationwide ground stop can result from an essential information-system failure even when the direct fault is not radio communications. |
| June 20, 2025 | A Jacksonville center telecom issue caused some equipment losses, but critical services continued through available redundancies. | Backup capacity can prevent a local fault from becoming a more serious operational shutdown. |
| September 19–20, 2025 | Dallas-area telecommunications failures affected TRACON operations; the FAA said L3Harris had not ensured functioning backup redundancy. | Provider failures and contractor oversight can combine to worsen an outage. |
| July 2025 onward | Federal funds were appropriated for an accelerated, multi-year national modernization. | Modernization was already funded and underway before November 2026. |
| September 14, 2026 | GAO warned of incomplete lifecycle costs, missing integrated scheduling and risks created by acquisition waivers. | Oversight deficiencies were documented before the national outage. |
| September 21, 2026 | At the Philadelphia TRACON, the primary communications circuit failed; a backup fiber line in New Jersey had also been severed by construction workers, disrupting Northeast air traffic. | This was a separate regional outage. It is not evidence that a fiber cable was cut during the November 13 nationwide event. |
| September 28, 2026 | S. 5572, the $30.1 billion Modern Skies Act, was introduced. | The funding proposal preceded the November incident. |
| October 9 and November 10, 2026 | Lawmakers questioned SMART's evaluation, followed by the FAA's national expansion announcement. | A legitimate question about a separate software rollout, not evidence it caused the outage. |
| November 13, 2026 | The FAA halted departures nationwide after communications and data failures, lifting the order at about 8:15 p.m. Eastern. | The national stop lasted about four hours and 21 minutes from its formal effective start; airline disruptions outlasted it. |
| November 14, 2026 | Duffy said a contractor's copper-to-fiber upgrade and router work somehow caused an overload; officials were still investigating contractor error versus a faulty router. | The preliminary account adds a specific maintenance context but does not establish the exact trigger or contractor fault. |
See the FAA's archived general statements, its September 21 Philadelphia-area operations advisory, AP's September report on the cut backup fiber, AP's November 14 follow-up, GAO's September audit, and the introduced Modern Skies Act. Shared consequences do not prove that the incidents had the same triggering cause.
What Happened to Aircraft Already Flying? Was the Airspace Unsafe?
The FAA primarily restricted new departures. Aircraft that were already airborne remained under the air traffic management system and were handled through operational contingency procedures; some continued to land and others diverted. Certain international operations and departures involving Alaska and Hawaii were treated as exceptions or reviewed individually. AP's incident coverage.
It is misleading to say that every plane over America became uncontrollable or was ordered to land immediately. The national restriction was a precautionary capacity-management decision made because FAA leadership could not rely on normal operations under degraded conditions.
That does not make the problem trivial. A network carrying safety-critical communications or aircraft information must function correctly. When that confidence is reduced, controllers may have to rely on procedures that permit fewer aircraft to operate in a given sector. Holding departures is an appropriate way to avoid increasing pressure while the system is assessed and repaired.
Ground stop versus ground delay program: A ground stop holds affected aircraft at their departure airports; a ground delay program meters departures into a constrained airport or airspace using controlled release times. Neither term means that every airborne flight has lost control or navigation.
FAA Ground Stop Refunds: What Are Airlines Required to Give Passengers?
If an airline cancels your flight because of the FAA disruption and you choose not to travel or accept substitute transportation, you are generally entitled to a refund. The airline cannot deny the ticket refund solely because the underlying event was outside its control. But a refund for unused transportation and additional compensation for the inconvenience are separate legal questions. U.S. Department of Transportation's official refund guidance.
| Your situation | General U.S. passenger-rights rule |
|---|---|
| Airline cancels your flight; you decline rebooking and do not travel. | You generally qualify for a refund of the unused ticket, even if the cause was an FAA outage. |
| Airline significantly delays or changes your itinerary; you decline the changed trip. | You generally qualify for a refund under DOT's significant-change criteria. |
| You accept the airline's replacement flight and travel. | You generally do not also receive a full refund of the transportation you accepted. |
| You incur hotels, meals or other expenses because of an FAA-caused delay. | These are not automatically reimbursable under the federal ticket-refund rule; carrier commitments, policy, insurance and circumstances matter. |
| You paid for an optional service the airline did not provide. | Depending on the facts, the ancillary fee may also be refundable. |
Under DOT's current criteria, an arrival three or more hours later than originally scheduled is a significant delay for a domestic itinerary; the threshold is six or more hours for an international itinerary. Certain changed airports, added connections, earlier departures and involuntary cabin downgrades also qualify. DOT's list of qualifying changes.
What should an affected passenger do?
- Check the flight's actual operating airline for cancellation, rebooking options and an applicable travel waiver.
- If you still want to travel, compare the replacement flight with other available options. Accepting rebooking generally changes your right to a ticket refund.
- If you no longer wish to travel after a cancellation or qualifying significant change, request or confirm the refund to the original form of payment, not merely a travel voucher.
- Keep the cancellation notice, changed itinerary, receipts and relevant airline correspondence. These documents may matter for additional claims under the carrier's terms or travel insurance.
- Check the DOT airline customer service dashboard for voluntary airline commitments relating to disruptions within the airline's control. Do not assume an FAA failure qualifies for all those commitments.
Under the DOT's refund rules, refunds ordinarily must be issued within seven business days for credit-card purchases and 20 calendar days for other payment methods, subject to the rule's applicable conditions. Official DOT refund guidance. Additional legal protections may depend on the itinerary, country, contract or other circumstances, so this is U.S. federal consumer guidance rather than a universal compensation rule.
The Accountability Questions That Must Be Answered
There is a difference between restoring normal departures and demonstrating that a failure will not recur. A credible technical and financial explanation should answer both.
Incident and responsibility
- What exact change, physical failure or sequence first caused November 13's data inconsistency, and at which facility or device?
- Which voice, surveillance and coordination services were affected, for how long, and which facilities retained full service?
- Who approved and implemented any relevant network change, and what predeployment validation and rollback procedures were used?
- What duties belonged to the FAA, L3Harris, local telecommunications providers and other contractors under the applicable service agreements?
- Which backups worked, which did not, and whether common dependencies undermined supposed redundancy?
- Why was a nationwide ground stop required under the FAA's own less-restrictive-alternatives procedure?
- What exact recovery action supported lifting the restriction, and how was it validated?
Modernization and money
- How much of the already appropriated $4.75 billion for telecommunications had actually been obligated and expended, for which equipment and milestones, as of the incident?
- What is the independently reviewable full lifecycle cost, including government labor, long-term maintenance, facilities and the future modernization phase?
- How does the stated $50 billion need reconcile with the $12.5 billion already enacted and the $30.1 billion proposed bill?
- Which proposed spending lines specifically reduce the failure mode identified in the final incident report?
- Which airports, contractors and subcontractors would receive funding, through which selection processes and performance conditions?
- When will GAO's findings about the missing integrated schedule and procurement waiver be resolved, and what independent audits will verify progress?
The answers should be supported by FAA incident logs, a technical root-cause report, contract and service-level terms where releasable, published procurement records, a reconciled budget estimate and independently testable milestones. Commercial sensitivity and national security may justify withholding narrow technical details, but they do not eliminate the need for public explanations of safety outcomes and the use of public money.
The ground stop lasted hours. The questions about the infrastructure behind it and the billions requested to rebuild it should not disappear when the flights resume.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why did the FAA ground all flights on November 13, 2026?
The FAA restricted departures nationwide after a telecommunications and data problem affected multiple air traffic control facilities. Duffy said legacy switches and routers became overloaded. On Saturday, he said contractor work replacing a section of copper line with fiber and installing a router somehow caused the overload. Officials were investigating whether contractor error or a faulty router was responsible; the exact trigger and responsibility had not been established in a final public report.
Is the FAA ground stop over?
Yes. The nationwide restriction was lifted around 8:15 p.m. Eastern on Friday, November 13, 2026. Flight cancellations, crew displacement and delays continued Saturday; FAA officials expected airlines to return to normal schedules by Sunday.
What company caused the FAA ground stop?
No company's responsibility for causing the November 13 failure had been established in a final public finding. Duffy referred to a contractor doing copper-to-fiber and router work, but the Saturday AP account did not identify that contractor. Reporting linked the affected legacy network to L3Harris, which operates the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure; that does not establish that L3Harris performed this particular work or caused the failure.
Did a severed fiber line cause the November 13 ground stop?
No public evidence reviewed identifies a severed cable as the cause of the November 13 nationwide stop. The well-reported cut backup fiber was part of a separate September 21 Philadelphia-area outage: the primary circuit failed, and the backup line was found severed in New Jersey. On November 14, Duffy described copper-to-fiber upgrade work and router installation as preceding the overload, with the exact trigger still under investigation. AP reported the September incident; AP's November 14 update describes the separate national event.
Where is L3Harris headquartered?
Melbourne, Florida, at 1025 W. NASA Boulevard, according to the company's official corporate headquarters listing. The location does not identify the physical origin of the outage.
Does L3Harris own U.S. air traffic control?
No. The FAA is the federal agency responsible for the U.S. national airspace system. L3Harris performs contracted telecommunications infrastructure services; other companies have different operational and modernization roles.
Did the FAA give L3Harris $50 billion?
No. The $50 billion was a public funding figure expressed by Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy, not an identified payment or single award to L3Harris. Existing appropriations and proposed legislation must be tracked separately.
Why does the proposed $30.1 billion FAA bill include $10 billion for only three airports?
The introduced Modern Skies Act contains a transitional-hub airport program limited to no more than three qualifying airports. The grants could fund eligible terminal reconstruction and related projects. It is separate from the bill's direct telecommunications allocation, and no named recipients appear as final awardees in the introduced text.
Has the FAA already received money to modernize communications?
Yes. Congress appropriated $12.5 billion for air traffic control modernization in 2025, with $4.75 billion of that total specifically designated for telecommunications modernization. Appropriation does not mean the entire amount was already paid to contractors or that replacement was complete.
Is the FAA modernization spending a scam or money grab?
The independent audit documents substantial weaknesses in cost estimating, project scheduling and acquisition oversight. Those are reasons for scrutiny. They are not proof of fraud, and the existence of genuine aging infrastructure is also well documented. The correct test is whether the proposed funding is supported by a complete budget, competitive procurement, measurable safety improvements and independent accountability.
Did the FAA's SMART AI system cause the outage?
No causal connection had been substantiated in the public record reviewed through November 14. Duffy said the failure involved older equipment, not the new SMART planning system. SMART's expansion shortly before the incident and lawmakers' separate questions about its testing do not prove a connection. The developer also denied that SMART was responsible; that vendor statement is not a substitute for an independent incident report.
Was the FAA hacked, and was this connected to Microsoft's outage?
Officials reported no evidence of a malicious cyberattack in their November 13 public briefing, and no connection to the contemporaneous Microsoft incident had been substantiated in the record reviewed through November 14. The complete technical cause remained under investigation, so later evidence could change the assessment.
Were planes already in the air in danger or forced to land?
The national ground stop principally restricted new departures. Airborne planes were managed under applicable procedures, with some diversions and exceptions. The nationwide response does not prove that every radar or radio was down.
Are canceled flights refundable after a nationwide FAA ground stop?
Generally yes when the airline cancels your flight and you decline rebooking or other substitute travel. Certain significantly delayed or changed flights also qualify. Hotel, meal and inconvenience compensation are separate questions. See the DOT's current rules.
References and Further Reading
The references below prioritize original government documents and published contract records. Company statements are identified as vendor claims; reporting on November 13–14 is used for the preliminary national-outage account, while the September 21 report documents a separate regional fiber-cut incident.
FAA Statements, Procedures and Federal Audits
- ATCSCC Advisory 111: National Ground Stop, November 13, 2026: Federal Aviation Administration Command Center. Original formal event and effective times and the initial planned endpoint.
- FAA General Statements: November 13, 2026 Outage; November 10 SMART Expansion; 2025 Dallas and Jacksonville Incidents: Federal Aviation Administration. The agency's own dated statements confirm the ground-stop cause as initially described, its SMART rollout and the FAA's earlier, explicit findings about telecommunications redundancy. The separate incidents appear on one archive page.
- DOT Announcement on Lifting the November 13 Ground Stop: U.S. Department of Transportation, November 13, 2026. Official announcement of reopening and the administration's initial technical account; distinguish those statements from a final root-cause report.
- ATCSCC Advisory 146: Philadelphia TRACON Operations, September 21, 2026: FAA Command Center operational record noting the Philadelphia TRACON outage. The advisory documents the regional event; contemporaneous reporting supplies the severed-backup-fiber detail.
- FAA National Ground-Stop Procedures, Traffic Management Handbook, Chapter 18, Section 13: Federal Aviation Administration. Sets out the national ground-stop decision process, the use of less restrictive alternatives and operational documentation.
- Air Traffic Control Systems: Ambitious New Modernization Effort Needs to Improve Cost and Schedule Planning: U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 14, 2026. The central audit for project-schedule integration, lifecycle costs, procurement waivers, contract values, legacy-system conditions and telecommunications replacement progress.
- Air Traffic Control: FAA Actions Are Urgently Needed to Modernize Aging Systems: U.S. Government Accountability Office, September 2024. The original sustainability assessment for many aging air traffic systems, including those deemed unsustainable or potentially unsustainable.
- FAA Announcement Selecting Peraton as Prime Systems Integrator: Federal Aviation Administration, December 2025. Identifies the contractor overseeing the broader modernization initiative, a different role from operating the legacy FTI network.
- Department of Transportation's Airline Refund Rules: U.S. Department of Transportation. Authoritative federal guidance on canceled flights, significant changes, rebooking, refund rights and optional services.
- DOT Airline Customer Service Dashboard: U.S. Department of Transportation. A reference for airline commitments on certain disruptions within their control, distinct from the mandatory ticket-refund rules.
Legislation, Proposed Funding and Financial Oversight
- Public Law 119-21, Section 40003: Air Traffic Control Modernization Appropriations: U.S. Government Publishing Office, enacted July 4, 2025. The authoritative law text includes the $4.75 billion telecommunications allocation within the 2025 modernization appropriation.
- Modern Skies Act, S. 5572, Introduced September 28, 2026: Full Bill Text: U.S. Government Publishing Office. Primary text for the proposed $30.1 billion funding, the $10 billion pilot restricted to no more than three transitional-hub airports, the $2 billion cloud/telecommunications category, and transfer/reporting provisions. The source is the introduced version, not an enacted appropriation.
- U.S. Transportation Department's Modern Skies Act Announcement: U.S. Department of Transportation, September 28, 2026. The administration's own presentation of the proposal, its anticipated uses and the organizations supporting it. An advocacy statement, not independent proof of cost-effectiveness.
- FAA Modernization and Funding Background: Congressional Research Service report reproduced by EveryCRSReport. Explains the previously enacted modernization funding, telecommunications replacement needs and wider policy context.
- USAspending Award Record: AT&T FENS Early-Start Task Order: Federal spending database. Identifies a specific award under the future-network program; such records must be distinguished from a whole-program appropriation or actual cash expenditure.
- USAspending Award Record: Peraton Prime Systems Integrator: Federal spending database. Identifies the program-integration award. GAO supplies additional context for its negotiated amount and contract ceiling.
Contractor Roles and Vendor Statements
- L3Harris FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure: Network Architecture and Service Claims: L3Harris. The contractor's description of the FTI network, carrier diversity, modernization work and claimed uptime. Vendor-reported, not independently audited here.
- L3Harris Corporate Headquarters: L3Harris. Primary confirmation of the company's Melbourne, Florida address.
- L3Harris Reports More Than 50% Progress on FAA Telecommunications Modernization: L3Harris, May 2026. A company statement about its own modernization progress, which should not be conflated with differently defined GAO progress metrics.
- FAA Taps AT&T to Build Its Next Telecommunications Backbone: Aviation Week, August 27, 2026. Specialist reporting explaining AT&T's selection for FENS and its replacement of Verizon as prime for the new network.
- Missouri Reporting on the Modern Skies Act and St. Louis Lambert Airport: KBIA, October 2026. Reports the bill sponsor's public statement naming Lambert as a desirable beneficiary of the proposed airport-terminal program; there is no awarded grant.
- Peraton Corporate Headquarters and Locations: Peraton. Primary confirmation of Reston, Virginia headquarters.
- Veritas Capital: Peraton Selected for FAA Modernization: Veritas Capital, December 2025. The investor identifies Peraton as its portfolio company, grounding the ownership relationship without suggesting wrongdoing.
- ASI Announces 12-Year, $875 Million FAA SMART and FMDS Contract: Air Space Intelligence, June 22, 2026. Company statement establishing the reported headline contract value and the scope of its traffic-management software. Not evidence of payment in full or outage causation.
- Congressional Inquiry on SMART Safety Testing and Evaluation: Senator Chris Van Hollen and congressional colleagues, October 9, 2026. Primary record of oversight questions and the anticipated 90-day evaluation; it is not a technical determination that SMART failed.
Independent Reporting on the November 13–14 Outage and September 21 Fiber Cut
- FAA Lifts Nationwide Ground Stop That Blocked Takeoffs for Hours: The Verge, November 13, 2026. Documents the reported stop and lift times, preliminary router explanation, attributed CBS network-update report, and timestamped FlightAware disruption figures.
- FAA Says Airplane Departures Can Resume After Nationwide Ground Stop: Associated Press, November 13, 2026. Independent reporting on the national operational impact, precautionary character of the restriction and aviation recovery.
- US Air Travel Schedule Should Recover from Ground Stop by the End of Sunday, FAA Says: Associated Press, November 14, 2026. Reports Duffy's copper-to-fiber maintenance account, the investigation of contractor error versus a faulty router, and continuing airline disruption. It does not identify the contractor performing the November work.
- Flights Disrupted Across the US Northeast Due to Technical Problems at a Key Air Traffic Center: Associated Press, September 21, 2026. Documents the separate Philadelphia-area event in which the primary circuit failed and the backup fiber line had been severed by railroad construction workers.
- DOT Demands $50 Billion to Prevent Another FAA Disruption: Business Insider, November 13, 2026 U.S. time. Reports the Friday evening statements by Duffy and Mullin, including the $50 billion figure and the preliminary description of overloaded equipment. This is a report of officials' assertions, not a verified cost estimate.
Editorial currency and methods note: This article was updated against evidence available Saturday, November 14, 2026, Eastern time. The FAA's initial announcement and officials' later technical descriptions remain preliminary; no final public root-cause report establishing the complete failure chain or individual contractor fault was identified in this research. The September 21 fiber-cut incident is treated separately from the November 13 nationwide stop. The bill reviewed is the introduced version of S. 5572. Government contract ceilings, reported negotiated amounts, appropriated funds, obligations and actual payments are different financial measures. Figures and legal rules should be checked for revisions when the article is updated. The comparisons, calculations and conclusions above are editorial synthesis of the linked primary documents and contemporaneous reporting.
