What Is the 364-Day Law? How One Day Can Change Deportation and Immigration Consequences

A 364-day law is a state sentencing rule that generally limits certain misdemeanor offenses to a maximum of 364 days in jail rather than one year. States adopted these rules partly because federal immigration law can attach serious consequences to a conviction carrying a possible sentence of at least one year, even when the person receives much less time or never enters jail.

But there is a crucial distinction: A 364-day maximum sentence is not the same as a 364-day sentence imposed by a judge. Each can matter under a different part of federal immigration law. Neither makes someone immune from deportation.

A person convicted of a qualifying offense may avoid one particular immigration consequence because of the one-day difference, yet still face removal because of a different conviction, an offense that has no one-year threshold, or an independent immigration violation. The law is not an automatic-deportation switch, and reducing a sentence is not a blanket exemption from federal enforcement.

The rules come primarily from the federal Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), including its separate definitions of deportable offenses, aggravated felonies, and sentences.

What the 364-Day Law Actually Does

There is no single federal law called the "364-day law." The term usually refers to state legislation changing the maximum jail sentence authorized for specified misdemeanors.

Suppose State A classifies a particular offense as a misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in jail. State B defines the same general category as punishable by up to 364 days. Both states can still prosecute and punish the conduct. Yet the one-day difference may alter whether the offense satisfies a federal immigration rule requiring a maximum possible sentence of at least one year.

This is a change to the legal sentencing ceiling, not necessarily a reduction in the sentence that every defendant actually receives. A judge who would have imposed 30 days under the old law can ordinarily still impose 30 days under the new one. The practical change becomes important when a federal statute asks what the state could have imposed.

A separate practice is sometimes called a 364-day plea: a prosecutor and defendant negotiate, and a court approves, a sentence of less than a year for a particular conviction. That can matter when immigration law asks what sentence the court actually imposed, even if the offense itself remains punishable by several years.

These two mechanisms are often lumped together. They should not be. One changes a class of offenses through legislation; the other changes the sentence in an individual case.

Why Does One Day Matter Under Federal Immigration Law?

Congress created several criminal grounds for immigration removal and barriers to immigration benefits. Those rules use different tests to determine how a conviction is treated. Some consider the type of offense. Others consider the maximum possible sentence. Still others consider the sentence actually ordered.

The modern one-year issue is closely tied to federal immigration legislation from 1996. In the Immigration and Nationality Act's aggravated-felony definition, amendments made by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act lowered the sentencing threshold for certain crimes of violence and theft or burglary offenses from five years to at least one year.

That matters because an "aggravated felony" is a federal immigration classification, not simply whatever a state labels a felony. Some state misdemeanor convictions can qualify if the offense and sentence satisfy the federal definition. Conversely, some state felonies do not qualify under the particular aggravated-felony category being considered.

The consequences can be severe. An aggravated-felony conviction may establish a ground of deportability and restrict access to important forms of relief from removal. But not all aggravated-felony categories require a one-year sentence: the federal definition includes other crimes with different elements or thresholds.

States cannot amend these federal definitions. What they can change is the punishment permitted under their own criminal codes. Where a federal rule incorporates that state-law maximum or an imposed sentence, state choices can affect the result.

Why states adopted the 364-day approach

This is not a secret or accidental result. The legislative rationale is documented.

Washington's 2011 bill reducing gross-misdemeanor sentences by one day responded to the possibility that a person could serve only a few days for a state misdemeanor but still face serious federal immigration consequences because a one-year jail term had been formally imposed, with most of it suspended. The law took effect July 22, 2011.

Other states subsequently adopted comparable provisions. Their choices reflect a basic policy dispute: Should a state's classification of a relatively low-level offense expose a noncitizen to a severe federal consequence solely because its maximum punishment happens to be one year instead of 364 days?

The state reform answers that question for some offenses and some federal provisions. It does not repeal federal immigration law.

The Three Sentencing Numbers That Must Not Be Confused

The phrase "364-day sentence" sounds simple. In practice, the law may be looking at three entirely different numbers.

These distinctions follow 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B), which addresses imprisonment and suspended sentences, and 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A), which identifies several different criminal grounds of deportability.

Example 1: The maximum sentence matters even when no jail time is served

Imagine a noncitizen is convicted of an offense that qualifies as a crime involving moral turpitude under federal law. The crime was committed within the relevant period after admission, and its state-law maximum is one year. The person receives probation instead of jail.

The federal single-crime deportability test may still apply because it asks whether a sentence of one year could have been imposed, not whether one was imposed. If a properly applicable state law had instead capped that offense at 364 days when the person was convicted, this particular one-year element would not be satisfied. Other federal grounds could still apply.

Example 2: A mostly suspended one-year sentence can still count as one year

Imagine a qualifying theft offense with a sentence of 365 days, of which the judge suspends all but five days. For an aggravated-felony category that requires an imposed term of at least one year, the suspended portion can still count. Merely serving five days does not make the imposed sentence five days.

If the court instead imposes 364 days, that conviction does not satisfy that category's one-year imprisonment element. It may still have other immigration consequences.

Example 3: Six months can be the threshold, not 364 days

For a different federal rule, a person with one qualifying crime involving moral turpitude may potentially use the petty-offense exception if the offense's maximum possible punishment does not exceed one year and, if convicted, the sentence imposed does not exceed six months.

A 364-day maximum may fit the first requirement. An actual 364-day sentence imposed exceeds the second. Simply having a "364-day case" therefore does not settle whether the exception applies.

The petty-offense exception is written into 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). It applies to a specified inadmissibility ground, not as a general promise that six-month sentences eliminate every immigration problem.

Which Immigration Rules Does the One-Year Threshold Actually Affect?

The decisive question is not "Was the sentence 364 or 365 days?" It is "Which exact federal immigration provision is being applied to which offense?"

The main statutory sources are 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (aggravated felonies), § 1227(a)(2) (criminal deportability grounds), and § 1182(a)(2) (criminal inadmissibility grounds).

Crimes involving moral turpitude are not simply "all misdemeanors"

A crime involving moral turpitude, or CIMT, is a federal immigration-law category interpreted through statutes and court decisions. The label is not synonymous with misdemeanor, felony, violent crime, or every offense a person might regard as immoral. Crimes involving dishonesty or serious culpable conduct may qualify, but the elements of the actual conviction are essential.

For one particular deportability ground, INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) generally requires a CIMT committed within five years after admission, with a special ten-year period for a specified adjustment category, and an offense for which a sentence of one year or longer may be imposed. If the punishment maximum is legally 364 days, the one-year requirement is absent. That does not automatically erase other CIMT-based rules, including inadmissibility, multiple convictions, or restrictions on discretionary relief.

The last distinction is particularly important. A person can fail to satisfy the precise elements of one deportability provision yet still face difficulty obtaining or retaining an immigration benefit for reasons governed by another statute. In its 2025 decision in Matter of De Jesus-Platon, the Board of Immigration Appeals addressed that distinction in the context of cancellation of removal and an older conviction.

An aggravated felony may not be a state felony

Under INA § 101(a)(43), some categories turn on the offense alone or on different statutory conditions; some expressly require an imposed prison term of at least one year. The one-day technique matters most for the categories that use that term-of-imprisonment requirement.

The federal classification can have much greater immigration consequences than the state sentence by itself suggests. For example, a state may treat an offense as a misdemeanor even though its one-year sentence makes it an aggravated felony for federal immigration purposes. State offense labels do not control the federal inquiry.

Why the name of the crime does not always tell you the answer

It is not enough to know that someone was convicted of "assault," "theft," or "domestic violence." States define these crimes differently, and federal immigration law may require comparing the offense's legal elements with a federal definition.

The Supreme Court explained the commonly used categorical approach in Moncrieffe v. Holder (2013): the inquiry often focuses on what the statute of conviction necessarily requires, rather than simply adopting the alleged facts of the case. Some statutes permit a modified categorical analysis, and some immigration provisions call for different inquiries. The practical point is that an ordinary-language offense label cannot resolve every immigration consequence.

Does a 364-Day Sentence Prevent Deportation?

Sometimes it prevents a particular conviction from triggering a particular deportation ground. It does not prevent deportation as a general matter.

Four separate questions determine the result:

1. What offense was actually established by the conviction? The federal classification may depend on statutory elements and the record of conviction.
2. Which sentencing test does that federal provision use? Maximum possible sentence, actual imposed sentence, or no one-year threshold at all?
3. Does another immigration ground apply? A different conviction, entry or status issue, or a separate offense-specific rule may remain.
4. Is the person eligible for relief from removal? Avoiding an aggravated-felony classification can preserve options in some cases, but preserving eligibility does not mean relief must be granted.

This also explains why the frequently repeated phrase "automatic deportation after a one-year sentence" is wrong as a universal rule. A one-year sentence is not itself a freestanding deportation law. Federal immigration authorities must identify an applicable legal ground and follow the procedures relevant to that person's case.

There are especially serious consequences for qualifying aggravated-felony convictions, including restrictions on relief, but deportability, detention, an immigration court order, and physical removal are distinct legal matters. Immigration proceedings can involve administrative decisions, hearings, appeals, and statutory exceptions. The Department of Justice describes those processes in its immigration court overview.

Deportability and inadmissibility are not interchangeable

A lawful permanent resident admitted to the United States may face a deportability analysis under 8 U.S.C. § 1227. A person seeking admission, a visa, or adjustment of status may instead encounter inadmissibility rules under 8 U.S.C. § 1182. Those rules overlap, but they are not identical.

Someone without lawful immigration status may be removable on an independent ground even if a criminal conviction carries no deportation trigger at all. Conversely, a green-card holder may have maintained lawful status for decades before a conviction introduces a new removal risk. A 364-day statute can matter in both situations, but for different reasons and with different limits.

What about immigration detention?

Detention is another question. The Laken Riley Act, enacted January 29, 2025, added mandatory immigration-custody provisions for certain inadmissible noncitizens connected to specified offenses, including some who have been charged or arrested rather than convicted. Those provisions are not canceled by a state's 364-day sentencing maximum. Nor does a detention provision itself establish that every detained person must ultimately be removed.

Which States Have 364-Day Sentencing Laws?

Several states have enacted 364-day maximums for defined misdemeanor classes. The laws do not all cover the same offenses, and not every 364-day provision was enacted for precisely the same reason. The table below identifies principal, verifiable provisions as of November 10, 2026. It should not be mistaken for a list of every state offense with a maximum below one year.

Three differences deserve particular attention.

California and New York: Both legislatures addressed older convictions or sentences in their state laws. Federal courts nevertheless ruled that a retroactively lowered state maximum did not rewrite the historical maximum possible punishment for the particular federal deportability test they examined.

Utah: The state previously adopted a broader 364-day approach, but its 2025 H.B. 226 restored a one-year maximum for many Class A misdemeanors involving offenses against individuals. Certain listed offenses remain capped at 364 days. Describing Utah today as a state where all Class A misdemeanors top out at 364 days would be inaccurate.

Rhode Island: Legislators enacted the change in June 2026, but the effective date is July 1, 2027. The difference between passed and in force matters in any legal reference. The Rhode Island General Assembly's announcement explains the legislation's stated objective, while the enacted text supplies the operative date.

A critical qualification applies to every entry: state criminal law changes do not, by themselves, rewrite federal immigration law. The offense date, conviction date, governing statute, and controlling federal interpretation can all matter.

How 364-Day Sentences Enter Plea Bargaining

Not every 364-day sentence comes from a state's misdemeanor cap. Some are individual sentencing decisions negotiated in criminal cases.

A prosecutor may recommend a particular plea or sentence, a defendant may accept or reject a proposal, and the court retains its role under the applicable state procedure. Immigration consequences may be considered alongside criminal punishment, evidence, public safety, and the circumstances of the case. Nothing in a 364-day statute obligates a prosecutor to dismiss charges or a judge to impose 364 days in every case.

The Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) established that defense counsel must advise noncitizen defendants about the risk of deportation associated with a guilty plea. The Court also recognized the importance of considering immigration consequences in plea discussions. That does not make immigration-safe outcomes an entitlement.

Here is the important distinction:

• Statutory reform: A state legislature changes the possible maximum for an entire covered offense category, generally regardless of the defendant's citizenship.
• Case-specific sentencing: A court imposes a particular term on a particular conviction. Whether that term avoids an immigration consequence depends on the federal category and the legality of the sentence.

A misdemeanor maximum can affect federal law even if no plea discussion ever mentions immigration. A felony plea to 364 days can matter even when the state's felony maximum remains several years.

What Real Cases Reveal About the One-Day Difference

Court records show why neither "364 days prevents deportation" nor "364 days changes nothing" is accurate.

People v. Manzanilla (California, 2022): A single day altered aggravated-felony exposure

In People v. Manzanilla, a lawful permanent resident pleaded no contest to a California felony involving injury to a cohabitant and received 365 days in county jail. The appellate court held that his counsel failed to adequately address the immigration consequences and had not attempted an otherwise plausible 364-day counteroffer. The appellate court reversed the denial of his motion to vacate and remanded with instructions to grant the motion and set the matter for further proceedings.

For that conviction, the court explained, a 364-day term would have avoided the aggravated-felony crime-of-violence classification tied to a one-year imposed sentence. But it also acknowledged that the underlying domestic violence conviction carried a separate deportability ground independent of that sentence length.

Lesson: The one day could affect whether the aggravated-felony bar applied and whether certain relief remained possible, without making the underlying conviction immigration-neutral. The opinion did not establish that a negotiated 364-day plea was ultimately entered.

People v. Martinez (New York, 2023): The shorter sentence did not cure an independent immigration violation

In People v. Martinez, a defendant received 364 days following a guilty plea to an aggravated driving-while-intoxicated charge. His former counsel described the term as intended to avoid an aggravated-felony sentencing threshold.

The defendant nevertheless faced immigration proceedings based on entry without inspection, a ground separate from his criminal conviction. A New York court denied his subsequent motion attacking the conviction, while also recounting his dispute about whether a shorter jail term might have affected potential immigration relief.

Lesson: Even a deliberately selected 364-day sentence cannot erase an independent immigration ground or guarantee eligibility for relief.

Matter of Boye (Board of Immigration Appeals, August 2026): Probation did not erase a 12-month sentence

The Board of Immigration Appeals' 2026 decision in Matter of Boye concerned a Georgia family-violence battery conviction. The original sentencing order imposed 12 months of confinement, all to be served on probation. More than six years later, a different state judge issued an order describing the disposition as straight probation.

The Board held that the later order did not validly undo the original term for immigration purposes. It sustained the government's appeal and remanded the case. The decision also expressly observed that a separate domestic violence deportability ground did not require a sentence of imprisonment.

Lesson: A term recorded as imprisonment can count even if served on probation, and a later document cannot necessarily rewrite its federal meaning.

These decisions illustrate different legal questions: the original sentence, independent grounds of removal, and the limits of post-conviction revisions. They should not be treated as interchangeable precedents.

What If the Conviction or Sentence Is Several Years Old?

This is where a common oversimplification can become genuinely costly. There are at least three different forms of later legal action:

1. A state changes the maximum sentence for an offense category.
2. A criminal court modifies or clarifies the sentence in an individual case.
3. A court vacates a conviction because of a procedural or substantive legal defect.

They do not automatically have the same federal effect.

Retroactive state laws do not necessarily change the historical federal test

California's § 18.5 and New York's § 70.15 contain retroactive state-law provisions. But the Ninth Circuit's Velasquez-Rios v. Wilkinson and the Second Circuit's Peguero Vasquez v. Garland rejected applying those later reductions to change the historical maximum possible sentence for the specific one-year CIMT deportability provision.

The reasoning was that the federal question looked backward to the law applicable to the conviction, rather than treating a later state amendment as though the earlier maximum had never existed.

That is a narrower holding than "retroactive sentencing relief never works." It does not determine the federal consequences of every properly vacated conviction, every genuine sentencing error, or every other immigration provision.

A later sentence reduction can also face independent federal limits

In Matter of Thomas and Thompson (2019), the Attorney General adopted a rule generally recognizing state sentence alterations for immigration purposes when based on a substantive or procedural defect, but not merely on rehabilitation or a desire to avoid immigration consequences.

The later Matter of Boye (2026) shows the practical force of that distinction. A purported clarification issued years later, unsupported by an identified defect and contrary to the original sentence, was not enough.

The Board's Matter of De Jesus-Platon (2025) demonstrates a related evidentiary problem: simply producing a state order vacating a conviction may not prove, by itself, that the vacatur was based on the kind of underlying legal defect federal immigration adjudicators require.

A state court may have authority to change a state criminal judgment, while a federal immigration tribunal has a separate obligation to determine what that judgment means under federal law. A case's dates, exact statutory provisions, original sentencing documents, and reasons for later changes matter.

Do These Laws Reduce Punishment or Protect People Who Reoffend?

A 364-day maximum does reduce the legal maximum for the offenses covered by one day. It does not make the conduct lawful, prohibit prosecution, erase an existing conviction, require an early jail release, or prevent prosecutors from bringing applicable felony charges supported by the facts and law.

For someone whose punishment would otherwise have been well below one year, the actual jail sentence may be unchanged. For someone who would otherwise have received exactly one year under a covered statute, the state maximum is one day shorter. The potentially much larger change arises from how federal immigration law classifies the conviction, not from a dramatic reduction in state punishment.

The policy tradeoff is real. Supporters argue that a one-day difference in state sentencing classifications should not automatically create severe, sometimes lifelong immigration consequences for relatively minor convictions. Critics question whether intentionally limiting a federal removal ground is appropriate, particularly when criminal accountability and victim protection are involved. Those are arguments about proportionality, enforcement, federalism, and the purpose of criminal punishment.

But an empirical conclusion requires data. The existence of these laws does not establish that they cause additional violent crime, fewer prosecutions, more repeat offending, or greater public safety. To evaluate such claims, researchers would need comparisons of charging, sentencing, immigration decisions, reoffending, and reporting behavior while accounting for other legal and demographic changes. The sources reviewed for this article establish the laws' mechanisms and judicial consequences; they do not support a credible nationwide causal estimate of their public-safety effects.

That uncertainty should not obscure what is established: the statutes deliberately alter a state sentencing input that some federal immigration tests use. Their effect is legally meaningful but sharply conditional.

Common Questions About the 364-Day Law

Is there a federal 364-day law?

No. Federal immigration law contains several relevant one-year and six-month thresholds. "364-day laws" commonly refer to state criminal sentencing reforms or to individual sentences imposed below one year.

Does every state cap misdemeanors at 364 days?

No. State classifications vary. Some states cap specified misdemeanor categories at 364 days, others at six months or less, and others retain a one-year maximum for certain misdemeanors. Special offenses and exceptions can override a state's general category rules.

Is 364 days automatically a misdemeanor?

No. A state felony may receive a sentence shorter than one year in an authorized disposition, and some misdemeanors have lower maximums. The offense classification and the imposed sentence are distinct matters.

Can a misdemeanor be an aggravated felony for immigration purposes?

Yes. A federal immigration category called an "aggravated felony" can include a state misdemeanor if the federal statutory requirements are satisfied. The state's label is not conclusive.

If someone serves only six months of a one-year sentence, does that avoid the one-year rule?

Usually not when the relevant rule measures the sentence imposed. A full year ordered by the court may count even if part of it was suspended or the person was released sooner. The distinction is between sentence imposed and actual time served.

Is a 364-day suspended sentence the same as no jail sentence?

No. Federal law can count imprisonment ordered by a court even when suspended. The exact judgment matters, especially where a disposition involves probation or a suspension of imposition rather than an expressly ordered jail term.

Can ICE deport someone sentenced to less than one year?

Yes, if another lawful removal ground applies. The one-year threshold is relevant to only certain conviction-based rules. Drug offenses, qualifying domestic violence, immigration-status violations, and other grounds can arise independently.

Does the petty-offense exception require a 364-day sentence?

No. For the qualifying single-CIMT inadmissibility exception, the maximum possible sentence must be no more than one year, while the sentence imposed must not exceed six months. Those are different requirements.

Can someone receive multiple 364-day sentences?

Depending on state law and the convictions, multiple sentences may be imposed and may run concurrently or consecutively. A one-year threshold that is tied to the sentence for a particular offense should not automatically be evaluated by simply adding unrelated counts together. Other immigration rules can consider multiple convictions or aggregate sentences. The actual statute being applied controls.

Can a judge change a 365-day sentence to 364 days afterward?

A state court may have authority to modify a judgment under state law, but the federal immigration effect is not guaranteed. Under the applicable federal precedents, the reason for the change and whether it corrects a genuine substantive or procedural defect may be decisive.

Does a 364-day law protect a green-card holder more than an undocumented immigrant?

There is no single answer. A lawful permanent resident may be confronting a conviction-based removal ground; a person without lawful status may have a separate immigration problem before the conviction is considered. In both situations a shorter sentence could influence specific federal consequences or potential relief, but it is not an immigration status or a guarantee of remaining in the United States.

What documents actually determine the result in an individual case?

At minimum, the offense statute and version in force when relevant, the charging and conviction records, the original judgment, the exact sentence imposed, any later court orders and their stated legal basis, and the person's immigration history. A qualified criminal-defense attorney working with an immigration attorney can assess how those records interact under the governing law. A generic "364-day" label cannot substitute for that analysis.

What the One-Day Difference Really Means

The 364-day approach is neither a fictional loophole nor a universal shield against deportation. It is a consequence of how federal immigration law sometimes incorporates state criminal sentencing decisions.

One year can matter because it is a federal legal threshold. But the consequence does not follow from the number alone. It follows from a defined offense, an applicable immigration provision, the correct measure of the sentence, the timing of the conviction, and the person's broader immigration circumstances.

That is why two people with seemingly similar 364-day sentences can face different outcomes. One may avoid a particular aggravated-felony classification. Another may remain removable under an independent ground. A third may confront a six-month limit rather than a one-year limit. And a fourth may find that a later state-law change does not alter the federal treatment of an earlier conviction.

The one-day difference is real. What it changes depends on which law is counting.

References and Further Reading

Federal Statutes and Official Immigration Procedures

• 8 U.S.C. § 1101: Definitions — U.S. Code. Defines aggravated-felony categories and the federal treatment of convictions, imprisonment, and suspended sentences. Particularly relevant: INA §§ 101(a)(43) and 101(a)(48).
• 8 U.S.C. § 1227: Deportability Grounds — U.S. Code. Establishes the single-CIMT possible-sentence test, multiple-CIMT grounds, aggravated-felony deportability, and certain offense-specific grounds independent of one-year sentences.
• 8 U.S.C. § 1182: Inadmissibility Grounds — U.S. Code. Contains the petty-offense exception and other provisions relevant to visas, admission, and adjustment of status.
• 8 U.S.C. § 1229b: Cancellation of Removal — U.S. Code. Sets eligibility conditions for forms of discretionary cancellation of removal and helps explain why avoiding one removability ground is not the same as qualifying for relief.
• Executive Office for Immigration Review: Learn About the Immigration Court — U.S. Department of Justice. Explains immigration court functions, decisions, and appeals.
• Laken Riley Act, Public Law 119-1 (2025) — Official enacted federal law. Provides a distinct detention framework for specified inadmissible noncitizens and alleged offenses; it does not establish a universal one-year deportation rule.

Supreme Court, Appellate Courts, and Immigration Decisions

• Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) — U.S. Supreme Court. Establishes defense counsel's constitutional obligation to advise about deportation risks associated with guilty pleas.
• Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) — U.S. Supreme Court. Explains categorical analysis of state offenses under the federal aggravated-felony definition.
• People v. Manzanilla, B313557 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022) — Published California appellate opinion. Demonstrates why a 365-day term rather than 364 days can change aggravated-felony exposure in a particular case.
• People v. Martinez, 2023 NY Slip Op 50308(U) — New York State Law Reporting Bureau. Shows why a 364-day sentence does not eliminate an independent ground involving entry without inspection.
• Velasquez-Rios v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2021) — Federal appellate ruling on California's retroactive maximum-sentence reduction under the specific CIMT deportability provision.
• Peguero Vasquez v. Garland, No. 21-6380 (2d Cir. 2023) — Federal appellate ruling addressing the analogous New York retroactivity question.
• Matter of Thomas and Thompson, 27 I&N Dec. 674 (A.G. 2019) — U.S. Department of Justice precedent addressing when later state sentence alterations receive federal immigration effect.
• Matter of De Jesus-Platon, 29 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 2025) — Board of Immigration Appeals precedent on a California offense, historical sentencing law, cancellation of removal, and proof supporting a vacated conviction.
• Matter of Boye, 29 I&N Dec. 826 (BIA 2026) — Board of Immigration Appeals precedent on a 12-month confinement term served on probation and an ineffective later sentence-clarification order.

State Statutes, Legislative History, and Current Changes

• California Penal Code § 18.5 — Current published statutory text of California's 364-day cap and its state-law retroactivity provisions.
• Colorado Revised Statutes § 18-1.3-501 — Current misdemeanor classifications, offense-date distinctions, and general Class 1 maximum.
• Minnesota Statutes § 609.0342 — Official statute governing gross-misdemeanor maximums and certain earlier sentences.
• Nevada Revised Statutes § 193.140 — Official gross-misdemeanor provision and express exception for differently specified penalties.
• New York Penal Law § 70.15 — Official maximum-sentence and state retroactivity provisions for misdemeanors.
• Oregon Revised Statutes § 161.615 — Official misdemeanor maximums, including the Class A 364-day rule and unclassified-offense distinction.
• Washington RCW § 9A.20.021 — Official gross-misdemeanor and misdemeanor sentencing limits under Title 9A.
• Washington S.B. 5168 (2011): Legislative History — Official bill history documenting the one-day reduction and effective date.
• Utah H.B. 226 (2025): Enrolled Criminal Amendments — Official legislation restoring the one-year maximum for many Class A offenses against individuals while retaining specified 364-day limits.
• Rhode Island H7198A (2026): Enacted Text — Official legislation changing the misdemeanor sentencing definition, with an effective date of July 1, 2027.

Editorial currency note (November 10, 2026): This article describes federal statutes, selected state provisions, and judicial decisions verified for the stated research date. State sentencing laws, federal immigration rules, and controlling interpretations can change. The state table identifies principal provisions rather than every exception or every state offense. This article is an explanatory reference, not individualized legal advice.